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iii

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH
CODEANN.(1996).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
For more than three years prior to the filing of this action, plaintiff suffered from
breathing difficulties for which he sought medical treatment. At some point, plaintiff
began to suspect that his problems were related to asbestos exposure, but his doctors
informed him otherwise until 2002, shortly before he filed this action. The trial court held
that because the plaintiff subjectively believed that his breathing problems were asbestos
related, he knew or should have known that he was injured by the defendant's conduct,
and his claims were time-barred. This holding raises two issues:
(1) Was the trial court's ruling, which implicitly finds that the plaintiff subjectively
believed he was suffering from an asbestos-related injury more than three years before he
filed this action, supported by the record such that there was no material question of fact?
(2) Generally, is a plaintiffs subjective belief that a defendant has harmed him
enough to start the running of a statute of limitations, when the plaintiffs own doctors are
advising him that his subjective beliefs are objectively unsupportable?
Standard of Review: The grant of a motion for summary judgment raises only
legal issues, which this court reviews for correctness. E.g., Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am.,
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1991); Winegarv. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107
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(Utah 1991). This court does not defer to the trial court's conclusion "that facts are
undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported by those facts." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein
& Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah
1996). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views the facts and all
inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.;
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales Kinglnt'l, Inc., 17 P.3d 1100 (Utah 2000) (citations omitted).
The court will affirm "'only if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
undisputed facts."5 Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1289 (citation omitted). "[DJoubts about
whether a nonmovant has established a genuine issue of material fact should be resolved
in favor of permitting the party to go to trial." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 107
(Utah 1992).
This issue was raised by the defendants in their motion for summary judgment (R.
470-473), the memoranda and other papers filed by the parties in support of and in
opposition to defendants' motion (R. 447-469), and at the hearing on the motion. (R.884)

2

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is determinative of the issue and provides as
follows:
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment.

(c)
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion [for summary
judgment], memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in
accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as
to the amount of damages.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court
Below.
This is an action brought pursuant to the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA)

to recover for personal injuries (asbestosis) arising out of the plaintiffs exposure to
asbestos. (R. 1-12) Although the plaintiff was not diagnosed with asbestosis until shortly
before this case was filed, defendant Union Pacific Railroad filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing, in part, that the plaintiffs claims were barred by the three year statute
of limitations found in the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). (R. 447-469)
The trial court granted Union Pacific's motion on the timeliness issue, basing its
ruling on plaintiffs concession that he had been suffering from various pains in his chest
for many years prior to his diagnosis, and on his testimony that subjectively, and
notwithstanding what his own doctors were telling him, he believed his problems were
asbestos-related. (R. 885-888) As the trial court stated it:
[Pjlaintiff admits knowing he was severely injured, even before he quit
working at his own roofing business in 1995. Moreover plaintiff admits
subjectively believing asbestos was harmful and that his illness was caused
by asbestos. (R. 887)
The order dismissing Union Pacific Railroad Company was entered on July 6,
2004. (R. 942-945) On September 20, 2004 this Court made a Minute Entry granting the
Plaintiffs (unopposed) Rule 54(b) Motion to Enter Final Judgment as to Union Pacific
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Railroad Company and to Certify as Ready for Appeal. (R. 977-979) This Court entered
final judgment as to Union Pacific Railroad Company on October 18, 2004. (R. 985-986)
B.

Statement of Facts
Plaintiff Carol Christiansen worked for the Union Pacific Railroad for one year, in

1951, in both Wyoming and Idaho. (R. 563) He worked as a machinist and as a
machinist's helper, and was involved primarily in re-building old steam engines. (R. 563,
565) This work exposed him to asbestos both from the old parts he was removing and the
new parts he was installing, which he often had to cut and manipulate to make them fit.
(R. 563) The asbestos products he worked with included sheet asbestos used around the
steam tanks in the locomotives, and asbestos mud which was used to coat firebricks and
steam pipes. (R. 563, 572) The asbestos mud was delivered in a powder form that he
was obliged to pour into a container and mix with water. (R. 573) Mr. Christiansen
believes that his one year of work at Union Pacific exposed him to some of the most
significant levels of asbestos that he encountered in his career. (R. 574)
Mr. Christiansen began experiencing chest and back pains in the mid 1990s,
around the time of his retirement, for which he immediately sought medical advice. (R.
575-76) He informed the doctors that he had been exposed to asbestos, but was
repeatedly tested for conditions not necessarily related to asbestos, and was treated with
physical therapy or told he suffered from mere congestion. (R. 575-77) He underwent
numerous CT scans and X-Rays, but was not advised that he had any asbestos related
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condition until 2002, when Dr. Mary Scholand, a pulmonologist at the University of Utah,
told him that she suspected he had asbestosis. (R.575, 579)
Dr. Scholand was not the first pulmonologist plaintiff consulted. He had also
previously met with one from St. Mark's hospital. (R. 582) The plaintiff told the St.
Marks pulmonologist that he worked around asbestos, but the doctor affirmatively
assured him that he was not suffering from asbestosis:
Q. Okay. Do you think doctor Scholand was the first doctor to check for
asbestosis?
A. Yes. Well, I don't know.
Q. Well, I know you don't know, but —
A. There was one other one just before that. He was a lung doctor, but —
Q. Do you remember his name, or where he was?
A. He was in St. Marks hospital.
Q. St. Marks. Okay.
A. And I told him that I'd worked around asbestos, and he says, no, he said, it
ain't asbestos. He says, it's just congestion.
Q. Okay. (R. 582)
Almost immediately after Dr. Scholand confirmed the asbestosis diagnosis,
plaintiff sought counsel and retained them to pursue claims for his injuries. (R. 583)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence submitted in this case raised a question of material fact as to when
plaintiff reasonably should have recognized the cause of his breathing problems, and the
trial court erred in finding otherwise. Although the plaintiff was aware of his lung
difficulties for several years before this action was filed, and eventually he suspected that
they might be asbestos-related, there is no clear evidence when that suspicion arose. The
6

most unequivocal testimony in the record suggests this occurred less than three years
before this action was filed. (R. 577) The trial court appears to have overlooked that
testimony in basing its decision on plaintiffs subjective beliefs.
Moreover, even if plaintiff subjectively believed that he suffered from an asbestosrelated condition more than three years before he filed suit, that alone is not enough for a
finding that his claims were time barred. Plaintiffs medical doctors repeatedly told him
that his lung condition was not related to asbestos. To require plaintiff to file an action in
accord with his subjective beliefs despite the contrary conclusions of his own treating
doctors creates a host of difficulties. It forces into the judicial system two classes of
cases: those that lack merit and will never be supported by medical testimony, and those
in which the plaintiffs hunch is correct but his condition has not yet developed to the
point where doctors can diagnose it accurately. The first class of cases will increase the
burden on the courts and defendants, to no benefit. The second class of cases will be
filed before the plaintiff has competent evidence to support his or her claims, and as such
they may be dismissed for all time. Then, when the plaintiffs doctors do find evidence of
a latent disease at a later time, they are barred from seeking relief based on the doctrine of
res judicata. In neither class of cases will the rule followed by the trial court prove to be
beneficial.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GROUNDS.
The timeliness of suits brought under federal law against private defendants, or
against the United States itself, are subject to equitable tolling principles. Irwin v. United
States, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990). Thus, for more than 50 years, FELA and other federal
law cases have been governed by the discovery rule, whereby the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the injured worker becomes aware of the fact of his injury and
its work-related cause. United States v. Kubrick 444 U.S. I l l , 122 (1979); Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Matson v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d
1233,1238 (10th Cir. 2001); Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1998);
Dubose v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 729 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1984).1
A.

The Fact That Plaintiff Subjectively Believed That His Problems Were
Asbestos Related Prior to a Medical Doctor's Diagnosis Was Not a
Sufficient Basis for Summary Judgment Because the Record Is Not
Clear About Whether That Subjective Belief Arose More than Three
Years Before the Case Was Filed.

The trial court expressly relied on plaintiffs subjective belief that his chest pain
was related to asbestos, but the trial court did not state when this subjective belief
indisputably arose, nor did it cite to the relevant testimony, and thus its reasoning is

^ t a h law is similar: for example under Utah Code Section 78-14-4, "the term
discovery of 'injur/ ... means discovery of injury and the negligence which resulted in the
injury." Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980) (quoting Foil v. Bollinger,
601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979).
8

flawed. Even if a court could properly rely on a plaintiffs subjective belief to advance
the beginning of a limitations period to some point before a doctor's diagnosis, in order to
justify summary judgment the evidence has to show that the belief indisputably arose
more than three years before the case was filed. Here, the evidence does not support that
conclusion to any degree - much less does it leave no question of fact. While the plaintiff
admitted suffering from chest pains for many years prior to filing this action, he did not
testify that he immediately linked those pains to asbestos. Rather, he arrived at this
subjective belief "a couple" years before his deposition was taken in 2003.
Q. Did you ever see any advertisements that caused you to go look for a
lawyer?
A. No. Well, until here last year, year and a half, I didnft know ... that it
was asbestos. I kind of, after they couldn't do nothing for me, then I got
thinking maybe it was asbestos, in the last couple of years.
Q. Was Dr. Scholand the first Doctor to tell you it was asbestos?
A. Yes.
Q. And when did she tell you that?
A. About a year ago.
Q. So it was in 2002?
A. Yeah.
Q. Can you tell me about what month?
A. Well, first she didn't know for sure. She said she thought it was at first.
And then she, I spent probably two months every few days going through
tests and stuff. And finally she said it definitely was.
Q. When do you think she told you it definitely was?
A. About the time I called these people [my attorneys]. Maybe a little
before that. (R. 579)
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A "couple" is used by some to mean "several," but its more common meaning is a pair, or
two. Of course, any doubts should have been resolved in favor of the plaintiff.2
In light of this unclear testimony, summary judgment based on this ground was
manifestly inappropriate. Indeed Union Pacific did not even assert below that plaintiffs
subjective beliefs could be a basis for finding that the statute of limitations began running.
The trial couifs reasoning was neither requested in, nor supported by the moving papers,
and the resulting order and judgment should be reversed.
B.

Even If Plaintiff Arrived at a Subjective Belief That He Was Suffering from
an Asbestos Related Condition More than Three Years Before Filing, That
Subjective Belief Was Not Enough to Compel Him to Take Legal Action in
Light of His Own Doctors' Advice to the Contrary.
"A claim does not accrue when a person has a mere hunch, hint, suspicion, or

rumor of a claim, but such suspicions do give rise to a duty to inquire into the possible
existence of a claim in the exercise of due diligence." Kronisch v. United States, 150
F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1998) (citingHobson v. Wilson, 111 F.2d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985)); see also Garza v. United States Bureau of Prisons,
284 F.3d 930, 935 (8th Cir. 2002). "The assessment of whether a plaintiff has acted
reasonably is an objective one

" Garza, 284 F.3d at 935.

2

Plaintiff also testified that around the time of his retirement in 1995, he began to
develop a belief that asbestos was causing medical problems, but it was not clear from the
testimony whether he was speaking about his own problems or about the medical
problems of some of his former co-workers. (R. 232-34)
10

Here, a "hunch, hint or suspicion," is all that plaintiff could have had regarding the
cause of his chest pains prior to the time that he was diagnosed with asbestosis. When it
comes to determining the link between chest pain such as that the plaintiff described, and
any particular cause, only medical doctors are qualified to express informed judgments.
The plaintiff may have claimed that he "knew" he was injured by asbestos before that
diagnosis, but the simple truth is that he was not competent to make that conclusion. At
most he could have believed in a causal relationship for which there was no firm
empirical proof. Objectively viewed, the plaintiffs decision to take no legal action
despite his personal beliefs was eminently reasonable, in light of what his doctors were
telling him.
The trial court's reliance on subjective belief leaves plaintiffs and their attorneys in
a very difficult position and if left to stand, could have serious negative consequences for
the judicial system and parties alike. If sick plaintiffs are expected to act on their
subjective suspicions and beliefs as to the cause of their illnesses even when doctors say
otherwise, two classes of cases will enter the courts. The first class of cases will be those
that are totally without merit, and which would not have been filed if plaintiffs knew they
were required to bring to court a firm medical diagnosis, and permitted to wait until they
had one. Plaintiffs in these cases will approach their attorneys and state that they are
firmly convinced that their illnesses were caused by the defendants' conduct, even if their
doctors state otherwise. Their attorneys, fearing malpractice liability, will feel obliged to
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file actions immediately, lest the claims become time-barred. However, without medical
testimony, the claims will be dismissed, after significant costs and efforts are imposed on
all parties and the courts.
The second class of cases that will enter the courts are meritorious cases filed by
persons whose latent diseases haven't yet developed enough for a firm medical diagnosis.
The defendants will scream in protest, and file motions for summary judgment that
probably will be granted. Most disturbingly, a summary judgment might, under the
doctrine of res judicata, forever destroy the plaintiffs rights to compensation, even if the
disease progresses to a point where the doctors reverse their conclusions and come to
agree with the plaintiffs earlier beliefs.
The importance of obtaining an informed medical diagnosis before being obliged
to seek legal redress is so well-established that courts, applying both federal limitations
law and state laws, have held repeatedly that even when a plaintiff believed or arguably
should have believed he had a case, his claim could not accrue while his own doctors
were rejecting his conclusion. The principle has been applied by no less than four federal
Courts of Appeal, as well as at least one District Court.
The Court of Appeals in Young v. Clinchfield Railroad Co., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961),
faced a FELA claim for silicosis. The plaintiff worked on a rig that traveled along train tracks,
repairing ties, and in the process it removed and crashed the rocks in between the rails, creating
silica dust. More than three years before he filed suit, the plaintiff had breathing difficulties, but
his doctors first suspected Tuberculosis and did not diagnose silicosis until shortly before he sued.
12

Nevertheless, the railroad argued that as a resident of the West Virginia mining region, plaintiff
must have known immediately that his breathing problems were from silica injuries. The court
rejected the assertion that the plaintiff laborer was qualified to diagnose the cause of his own
breathing difficulties:
Residence in the mining country of West Virginia does not invest one with the
expert knowledge or diagnostic skill sought to be attributed to the plaintiff. The
soughtfor inference could rest on nothing more than speculation. In spite of
frequent sojourns in the hospital where the plaintiff was many times given
complete physical examinations, it is noteworthy that not the slightest intimation
is found in the record that silicosis was even suspected by any physician who
examined him before August, 1956. Moreover, when the plaintiff was X-rayed as
late as June, 1956, the physician who read the negative thought that the plaintiff
might be suffering from tuberculosis. Not until August of that year, after
exhaustive medical tests, did this physician, a specialist in respiratory diseases,
diagnose silicosis. A medical judgment that eluded the specialist cannot
reasonably be expected from the plaintiff
288 F.2d at 503-04 (emphasis added).
^Aerojet-GeneralShipyards,

Inc. v. O'Keeffe, 413 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1969), the

shipyard employee filed a claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act - the maritime equivalent of the FELA. In pertinent part, he made a claim for lung fibrosis
related to his work as a sandblaster. Although he experienced breathing difficulties in 1964 and
attributed them to his work, his doctors did not agree with his self diagnosis until 1966, after
which he promptly filed a claim. The employer disputed liability and claimed that the claim was
barred by the statute's one year limitations period. The Court of Appeals disagreed:
We are convinced that the employee filed his application well within the one-year
statutory period. The Company contends, however, that Lee had experienced
breathing difficulties and arthritic pains periodically since 1964. The record does
indicate that Lee was aware of symptoms of his work-related diseases as early as
1964 and that he thought perhaps they might be caused or related to his working
conditions. What the Company neglects to consider is that several doctors
13

expressly rejected Lee's layman self-diagnosis and concluded that his problems
were not work related. The first diagnosis linking Lee's breathing difficulties and
arthritis with his working conditions occurred in January 1966, and the claim for
compensation followed shortly thereafter. The limitations period for occupational
diseases begins to run when the employee knows, or reasonably should know, that
his condition is a disease which arose out of his employment. [Citation] [A]
claim for occupational disease accrues only when the 'cumulative effects of
exposure manifest themselves1. [Citation] The effects must manifest themselves
to a physician rather than to an unschooled employee before limitations begin to
run. This analysis effectuates the policy that the Act is to be liberally construed in
a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results. [Citation]
413 F.2d at 795-76 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Harrison v. United States, 708 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1983), the plaintiff wife
of a military officer sought treatment for headaches at the Wilford Hall Hospital at Lackland Air
Force Base in Texas, in 1966. She underwent several tests including procedures which entailed
injecting her skull and spine with air, to perform x-rays. The tests failed to detect the cause of
her headaches, and she developed other neurological and memory problems afterward. Many
years passed and plaintiff sought care from a number of doctors, none of whom could ascertain
the cause of her condition. The plaintiff eventually became convinced that a number of her
problems were caused by damage to her brain suffered during the 1966 tests, but her doctors did
not share her belief. Then, the plaintiff retained an attorney who sought records from the 1966
tests. After being given the runaround for years by military officers in both Texas and
Washington, the attorney finally received the records, and they showed that during the tests a
needle accidentally pierced the thalmus portion of the plaintiffs brain. The scar tissue that
would form thereafter was a plausible cause of her difficulties. She filed her claim shortly
thereafter.
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The United States argued, inter alia, that the plaintiff s claim was untimely because she
herself believed for years that she had been harmed during the 1966 tests. The District Court
accepted this argument and dismissed the case, but the Court of Appeal reversed, making a
distinction between a plaintiffs belief dead actual knowledge.
In assessing the awareness required to trigger the statute of limitations, it is
essential to distinguish between "knowledge" and "belief." For one to have
knowledge of fact "x," three requisites must exist: (1) "x" must be true, (2) the
person must believe "x" to be true, and (3) the belief must be reasonably based.
A. Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy (1979); A. Quinton, "Knowledge and
Belief," Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967). "Belief," which is a component of
knowledge, requires only requisites (1) and (2)--"x" must be true and the person
must believe it to be true. As a consequence, conclusions based on dreams,
intuitions, suspicion, conjecture, ESP, speculation, or faulty reasoning, even if
true, are merely "belief." Absent a reasonable basis, these conclusions do not
rise to the level of "knowledge."

Prior to July 1976, Harrison had only a belief. She could not know the
basis for her injury. The myriad medical and legal experts could not express a
reasoned opinion that the cause of her impairment was an error in the medical
procedures conducted at Wilford Hall. They could not relate causally her
difficulties and Wilford Hall. It is not reasonable to suggest that before gaining
access to her records Harrison possessed the requisite knowledge of the cause of
her condition when doctors who knew immeasurably more than her were stymied
and freely admitted their bewilderment. It would be unreasonable to hold
Harrison to a higher degree of medical competence and understanding than the
many medical experts she consulted.
Harrison's suspicion or belief that her problems dated from Wilford Hall was
merely one of a series of explanations that she seized upon in anguish and
desperation to explain her illness. Her privately conceived notions did not
become knowledge until July 1976 when she received copies of her medical
records. Only then was she in a position to know that her difficulties were
caused by a slip in the procedures at Wilford Hall. See Aerojet-General
Shipyards, Inc. v. O'Keeffe, 413 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.1969).
708 F.2d at 1027-28 (emphasis added).
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In Dubose v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., supra, the Fifth Circuit said:
When a plaintiff may be charged with awareness that his injury is connected to
some cause should depend on factors including how many possible causes exist
and whether medical advice suggests an erroneous causal connection or
otherwise lays to rest a plaintifffs suspicion regarding what caused his injury.
729F.2datl031.
In Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980), an employee of a
munitions plant operated for the United States began experiencing angina attacks on
weekends, and eventually suffered a full-blown heart attack. She suspected for more than
two years before she filed her federal claim that the attacks were related to withdrawal
from her weekday exposures to nitroglycerin from the munitions and rocket propellants that
she handled. However, both her private physicians and the plant physician advised her that there
was no medical basis for that conclusion. Even after she read a union newspaper article that
suggested a link between nitroglycerin exposure and heart problems, and even after a
state safety inspector said he shared her beliefs, her doctors continued to tell her there was
no link. Finally, a scientific study found a link between exposure to nitroglycerin and
withdrawal-related heart attacks, and she brought a negligence claim against the United
States within two years thereafter. The United States asserted a limitations defense, and
the federal trial court ruled that most of the plaintiffs claims were time-barred, but the
Court of Appeals reversed, writing in part:
The Government contends Mrs. Stoleson's suspicion that nitroglycerin was
the culprit is sufficient knowledge of causation to trigger the statute of
limitations. We disagree. A laymanfs subjective belief, regardless of its
sincerity or ultimate vindication, is patently inadequate to go to the trier of
fact Therefore, had Mrs. Stoleson sought competent legal advice, she
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would have been informed quite correctly that she had no claim against the
Government.
629 F.2d at 1270 (emphasis added).3
The United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Maughan v. SW Servicing,
Inc., 758 F.2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1985), applied Utah law in much the same way that the
previous decisions applied federal law. The plaintiffs' claims were for leukemia suffered
by their decedents, allegedly as a result of pollution from a uranium mill located in their
town. The cases were filed far more than two years after each of the deaths. The court
recognized that under Utah law, the date of discovery rule for statutes of limitations
calculations was applicable only in three situations: when required by statute, when the
defendant has concealed facts or misled the plaintiff, or when there are exceptional
circumstances requiring tolling. 758 F.2d at 1384. The question before the court was
whether "exceptional circumstances" were presented by the fact that the plaintiffs
injuries were cancers that allegedly were the latent effects of chemical exposure. The
court ruled that they were:
Because of the complexity of the scientific data concerning causation of
cancer, the disparity of knowledge between plaintiffs and potential

3

The Stoleson court indicated that the statute of limitations would not have been
tolled if the advice she was receiving from her doctors was incompetent or otherwise
mistaken based on the current state of medical knowledge at the time, because the
defendant should not be punished for the fault of others, Id. n. 5, but that is not a
distinction relevant here. There is no evidence that the advice received by Mr.
Christiansen was incompetent or mistaken: it may be that evidence of his asbestos disease
was not detectable until his asbestosis diagnosis was made.
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defendants, and the often long latency period of the disease, this court
concludes that cases involving suspected carcinogens present "exceptional
circumstances" justifying application of the discovery rule.
758F.2datl385.
The U.S. Court of Appeals warned against application of a limitations rule that
immediately obliged plaintiffs to file actions on the mere suspicion that their cancers were
related to some toxic chemical or substance, because to do so might encourage frivolous
filings that would burden courts and defendants alike:
To adopt a rule that encourages the filing of lawsuits when one develops
cancer but has no knowledge of its cause, or which of several possible
causes, "is not consistent with the unarguably sound proposition that
unfounded claims should be strongly discouraged." Foil, 601 P.2d at 148.
In this time of crowded dockets, it is pure folly to suggest that the plaintiffs
should file suit against all sources of suspected carcinogens, with the
attendant economic and social costs, simply to prevent the running of the
statute of limitations.
758F.2datl386.
Most relevant here is the Court of Appeals' distinction, like that made in Harrison,
between knowledge of the existence of a claim, and a mere suspicion:
The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows or
should know of the facts constituting the cause of action, [citations],
including the fact of causation. There is a substantive difference between
knowledge of causation and mere suspicion, [citations] The statute cannot
start running when the plaintiff merely knows or should know that there is a
suspected link between a particular substance and cancer in general. ****
A rule that the statute begins to run as soon as a plaintiff becomes aware
that a particular substance is suspected to cause cancer in some people
would be absurd, for it would force the plaintiff to file suit against all
suspected sources of carcinogens simply to prevent the statute from
running. A plaintiff who did so, without further support for the allegation
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that a particular carcinogen caused his cancer, would be susceptible to
dismissal on grounds of frivolity.
758F.2datl387.
Applying those principles to the facts of the case before it, the Court of A.ppeals
held that the summary judgment was improper. In part, the Court based this holding on
the fact that the plaintiffs were told by several sources (other than the defendants) that
leukemia could not be caused by the defendant's mill:
Relevant factors to be considered include the undisputed fact that several of
the plaintiffs in this case did ask their doctors what had caused the
leukemia, and all were told that the cause was unknown, [citations]
Neither the local doctors nor the doctors consulted in Salt Lake City made
the correlation between the leukemia and the uranium mill, [citations] In
addition, the government studies that were produced explicitly reassured the
plaintiffs who were aware of them that there was no connection between the
mill and the cases of leukemia and that the radiation levels in Monticello
were normal, [citations] These factors may affect when a reasonably
diligent plaintiff would have been put on notice to investigate, and whether
he then would have discovered the cause of action.
758F.2datl389.
The final federal decision in this line of cases was Loughlin v. United States, 230
F.Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2002). The plaintiffs purchased a home on property that was once
used by the United States for chemical weapons and agricultural chemical research. For
many years there were reports and findings of contamination on neighboring property
during construction work or otherwise, but nothing concrete with respect to the plaintiffs
own property. The plaintiffs had been aware of one report written many years before they
filed suit, which identified the presence of a chemical that was hazardous only to aquatic
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life. They also hired a testing laboratory of their own to confirm that their land was safe.
The consequent report identified no dangerous levels of any hazardous substance. In the
face of a claim by the defendant United States that the plaintiffs knew or should have
know if the existence of the claims even before that second report was received, the
federal District Court responded:
In the face of these findings by two independent expert testing
organizations that no hazardous substances had been found on the land, the
government cannot seriously assert that the Loughlins had knowledge of an
injury at this stage.
230F.Supp.2dat42.
The most recent on-point decision was rendered three months ago by the Oregon
Court of Appeals, applying that state's law in an asbestos case similar to the one at hand.
Keller v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 107 P.3d 29 (Or. App. 2005). From the
early 1960s, Mr. Keller worked in various jobs involving mufflers and exhaust systems.
He was exposed to the fumes from vehicles, and also was a smoker. Because mufflers
often were made with asbestos cloth, he also was exposed to asbestos dust, both during
the time he worked for a muffler manufacturer, and when he removed old, crumbling
mufflers in order to replace them. Beginning in the early 1980s Mr. Keller experienced
breathing difficulties, but each time he visited the doctors they concluded that his
problems could not be firmly attributed to asbestos exposure or disease. The first
pulmonologist that he visited, in 1986, saw no evidence of asbestos in his lungs but said
that asbestos "might be" the cause of his problems. Id. at 31.
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He saw another doctor in 1991 who said his problems "possibly" were related to
asbestos. Id. That doctor filed a statement in support of an application for social security
disability benefits filed later that year, confirming Keller suffered from pulmonary
fibrosis but not stating the cause. Keller himself stated on the application that the cause
of his lung problems were exhaust fumes, dust, and asbestos. The record did not disclose
the results of the application.
Through the balance of the 1990s, the plaintiff continued to receive equivocal and
inconsistent diagnoses of his ailments. In 1995 he applied for workers compensation
benefits alleging injury from asbestos exposures, but the employer's examining doctor
found no asbestos causation for his injuries, concluding, "I believe his case can be closed
in that he has no asbestos related condition." Id. at 33. Keller's own doctors were asked
to review this report and signed statements that they agreed with it.
Finally, in 2000, a physician examined Keller's radiology and test reports and
diagnosed lung disease that, based on his work history, most likely resulted from asbestos.
The action was filed later that year. Based on the plaintiffs history of breathing difficulty
and his own suspicions that it was related to asbestos, the trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. However
the Court of Appeal reversed:
Based on the record in this case, we conclude that a factual dispute exists
about whether plaintiff actually discovered the cause of his disease before
1998 and about whether a person exercising reasonable care would have
discovered that cause before 1998. We agree with plaintiff that the facts
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available to him simply do not establish, as a matter of law, that he
discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, before 1998 that there
was a considerable degree of certainty that his symptoms were caused by
asbestos. On the contrary, his treating doctors consistently expressed
uncertainty about the nature of his condition and identified several possible
causes.
Id. at 37.
The Oregon appellate court likened the facts before it to the more settled line of
cases which hold that the defendant's fraud may toll the statute of limitations:
In this case, plaintiffs doctors consistently expressed uncertainty about the
cause of his disease and gave him several alternative explanations for his
symptoms. In that respect, this case is similar to those malpractice and
products liability cases in which courts have held that statutes of limitation
did not begin to run where plaintiffs received reassurances from defendants
that prevented plaintiffs from having sufficient certainty about the existence
of facts pertaining to the elements of the statutes of limitation.
Of course, in this case, the alternative explanations were not
presented with the intent of hiding a tortfeasor's wrongdoing or liability.
That intent is not important, however; the effect of an awareness of the
existence of alternative explanations on a reasonable person is. Where, as
here, a plaintiffs doctors consistently express uncertainty about the cause of
disease and present him or her with a number of equally plausible factual
explanations for his or her disease, that may preclude the conclusion that he
or she knew, or should have known, as a matter of law, that one of those
explanations was sufficiently correct to trigger the statute of limitations.
Id. at 37-38.
The plaintiff here investigated the source of his illness diligently and specifically
asked his doctors whether it might be causally linked to asbestos. He was told there was
no link, and under those circumstances it is impossible to conclude that he slept on his
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rights, such that the statute of limitations should run against him. See Burnett v. New
York CentralR. Co., 380 U.S. 424,429 (1965).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Carol Christiansen presented competent evidence that he reasonably
relied on the advise of his doctors in not filing claims for asbestos injury until 2002, when
a doctor advised for the first time that his breathing problems were related to asbestos
exposure. This created a factual issue as to whether Mr. Christiansen knew or reasonably
should have known what the cause of his breathing problems were. This Court should
reverse the judgment below and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this / V ^ d a y of June, 2005.

EISENBERG & GILCHRIST

S. BROOK MILLARD
C. RYAN CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
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Telephone: (801) 328-2200
Attorneys for Defendant
Union Pacific Railroad Company

1 - 8 2004

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROL CHRISTIANSEN,
ORDER DISMISSING UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY

Plaintiff,
vs.
ANCHOR PACKING COMPANY, et
al.,

Case No. 0209000216
Master Case No. 010900863 AS
Judge Glenn K. IwasaH

Defendants,

Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion For Summary Judgment came
before the Court for argument on April 23,2004. Plaintiff was represented by S. Brook Millard,
and defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company was represented by Casey K. McGarvey. The
Court having reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties, having heard the positions and
argument of counsel, and having entered its Memorandum Decision on April 29,2004, and for
good cause shown, now hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that defendant Union Pacific Railroad
Company's motion is granted, and that plaintiffs complaint as to Union Pacific Railroad
97

Company and all the alternative entities set forth in the master complaint is dismissed with
prejudice, and on the merits, -with costs to be awarded to Union Pacific Railroad Company as the
prevailing party, as allowed by law.
lis (t?
DATED this

day of *r?&

4-

2004.

BY THE

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
BRAYTONPURCELL
Robert G. Gilchrist
S. Brook Millard
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215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84111

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROL CHRISTIANSEN,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

Case No.

0209000216

H o n o r a b l e GLENN K. IWASAKI
ANCHOR PACKING COMPANY, e t

al.;

A p r i l 26,

200f:ILEDD,STR|CTC0URT
Third Judicial District

Defendants.

~m 2 9 2004
\

' ^ W

E

COUNTVN
Deputy Clerk

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant Union Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court

heard oral argument with respect to the motion on April 23, 2004.
Following the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motion^ memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the
following ruling.
Plaintiff in this action worked as a laborer in a tunnel, as

a machine

operator

on the railroad

line}

and as an

machinist in and around a repair facility.

assistant

During this

employment, plaintiff alleges he was exposed to asbestos.

As a

result of this alleged exposure, plaintiff contends he contracted
diseases attributable to asbestos.
With its

motion

for

summary

judgment, Union Pacific alleges

plaintiff cannot prove the levels of exposure at the relevant

CHRISTIANSEN v. ANCHOR PACKING

MEMORANDUM DECISION

times of any alleged exposure and he cannot prove even possible
exposure reasonably considered to be unsafe at the time.
Moreover, argues defendant, there is no evidence plaintiff ever
was on any operating locomotive when it was in use on line and
that he was then exposed to asbestos because of a defect.1
Finally, it is defendant's position that even if plaintiff could
prove negligence, his claims are time barred as he admits his
injuries were manifest before 1995.

Specifically, asserts

defendant, the FELA requires an action thereon to be commenced
within three years from when an injury is first manifest and this
action was not commenced until 2002.
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing Union Pacific was aware
of the dangers of asbestos well before plaintiff was employed by
it and Union Pacific negligently caused plaintiff to be exposed
to excessive levels of asbestos, despite knowing it could cause
significant bodily harm. Moreover, argues plaintiff, Mr.
Christiansen was not diagnosed with an asbestos related health
problem until he met with a pulmonologist in 2002.

According to

plaintiff, it was at this time that his condition was diagnosed
as asbestos related and the statute of limitations began to

*During oral argument plaintiff conceded this point.
Accordingly, Defendant Union Pacific's Motion is granted in this
regard.
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accrue.
After reviewing the record in this matter, and viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the
Court is persuaded plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to
create a duty and show a breach of that duty.

This said,

howeverr the Court further finds the action to be time barred.
Indeed, claims for exposure accrue when "the accumulated effects
of the deleterious substance manifest themselves."
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949).

In Urie v.

In the instant, plaintiff

admits knowing he was severely injured, even before he quit
working at his own roofing business in 1995.

Moreover plaintiff

admits subjectively believing asbestos was harmful and that his
illness was caused by asbestos.

Under any reading of these

facts, plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of both his
injury and its cause by the mid-1990's.

Accordingly, Defendant

Union Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
DATED this

^ s

day of April, 2004 .
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